funds, the financial situation, instead of improving, significantly deteriorates and this becomes manifest in a chronic budget deficit and a growing volume of government debt.
In short, such a country is soon faced with two kinds of problems: on the one hand, it becomes involved in a series of complex and ineffective political and economic projects. The economic projects often turn out to be ineffective owing to insufficient commercial and technical preparation -an assured abundance of "cheap" money is not conducive to serious cost-benefit analysis. It can also become embroiled in reckless foreign policy adventures, conceived, likewise, under the inebriating effect of financial abundance At the same time, the country's socio-economic priorities are transformed in conformity with the new, favorable, conjuncture. Faith in an endless supply of "cheap" money results in the neglect of "real" economy, since the shortcomings of domestic production can always be offset by imports. The quality of the output of domestic producers begins to deteriorate or the volume of output is reduced, but for some time this does not concern the government, such is their infatuation with economic growth based on extraordinary revenues from the export of raw materials.
However, when this source of revenues is suddenly curtailed (for example, owing to a change in market prices), a full-scale crisis ensues. Since the country's economy has become imbalanced by the structural and budgetary maneuvers of the preceding years (or even decades) of prosperity, any structural adjustment of the economy to the new level of prices precipitates a severe crisis -sometimes of a systemic character.
There have been instances of such upheavals in various countries in recent years as a consequence of the fluctuations in oil prices that followed the oil crisis of 1973. During the years of plenty a number of oil exporting countries had restructured their economic systems but now they were beset by serious crises. Mexico, the Soviet Union, and Iran under the rule of the Shah are the most obvious examples.
By the end of the 1970s, oil prices had reached the level of U.S. $90 per barrel and it seemed that exporters had found the answer to all of their problems. At that time Mexico's President, Jose Lopez Portillo, declared proudly: "We must learn to administer abundance." Soviet leaders pursued an active "oil-for-food" policy, purchasing abroad not only foodstuffs but also consumer goods and equipment for expanding oil and gas production. In Mexico, the policy of "administering abundance" (Portillo's expression again) consisted in a steep increase in growth rates and the pursuit of self-sufficiency by means of development of the state sector. The government launched a number of investment programs; growth rates increased from 3-4 percent (1975) (1976) (1977) to 8-9 percent (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) ; the average annual increase in investment reached 16 percent. During all of this time the budget remained in deficit, since, in the expectation of future revenues the government felt able to disregard this parameter. As the oil boom continued, the budget deficit, instead of reducing, actually increased. Mexico's economic health began to deteriorate when, at the beginning of the 1980s, the trend in oil prices began to change: GDP growth rates became negative; the peso was devalued by over 40 percent; foreign debt increased from U.S. $40 billion in 1979 to $97 billion in 1985. Capital flight accelerated, and the gold and hard-currency reserves plummeted to U.S. $1.8 billion. Much had been expected of Portillo, both at home and abroad, when he came to power; but towards the end of his six-year term of office he was being accused of wasting oil revenues, concluding "extravagant" foreign-loan deals and of excessive budgetary expenditure. Following his resignation, he was forced to leave the country. When he died in early 2004, he did not even receive the customary state funeral.
The case of the collapse of the Soviet Union is well known 8 . After a series of incoherent attempts at reforming the economy between 1965 and 1972, the Soviet government completely abandoned reform initiatives and sought instead to secure steady (albeit modest) rates of economic growth and social stability by stepping up energy exports.
The decline in oil prices and a growing budget deficit forced Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues to take a number of decisive measures aimed at reducing the country's dependence on raw materials -the so-called policy of "acceleration". However, their attempt to boost economic growth rates resulted in economic disequilibrium and, eventually, to the collapse of the system 9 .
Iran is another country where the régime first benefited from an oil price boom and then suffered a complete fiasco. Iran, moreover, by contrast with other countries, descended into crisis at a time when conditions on the world oil market were at their most favorable, and not because these conditions had deteriorated. The principal force for destabilization in Iran was the policy of accelerated economic modernization introduced by the government of the Shah.
This policy was administered largely from above and had no foundation in the realities of social and economic life. It made for a sharp increase in social conflict which culminated in the "Islamic revolution" of the late 1970s. Firstly, the susceptibility of natural resources to monopoly control is of considerable importance. Natural resources that are "scattered" throughout a territory are less vulnerable to state monopoly control and do not constitute a serious obstacle to economic development.
P. Sutela, arguing this case, has pointed to the example of Norway, where prosperity from the outset derived from rich fishery resources, primarily cod. The manner of extraction of this resource contrasts markedly with the extraction of hydrocarbons: the fish were available simultaneously in different regions; fishing did not require substantial investments; and the state could neither exercise rigid control over access to fishing, nor acquire ownership over this resource for subsequent exploitation. This meant that almost any Norwegian could engage in the fishing business and in this way the foundations were laid of economic and (as a concomitant) civil liberties in relation to the state. "…the point is not whether a country is rich in resources. The point is, rather, whether the resource provides a natural foundation for oligarchy and autocracy by being point specific, or whether it provides a natural foundation for democracy by being widely dispersed" 11 .
Another factor is the extent of natural resource diversification. Natural diversity and the absence of any marked economic preference for particular kinds of resources provide a basis for competition between different producers: the formation of a single-product economy or single-product exporting is avoided and the economy can become diversified. Diversification of control over natural resources and the avoidance of state monopoly control are important 10 One of the most eminent experts on this problem, T. Gylfason, has written: 'Experience appears to indicate that extensive natural wealth, if not well managed, reduces economic growth in the long run. True, it does provide nations with short-term wealth, often quite considerable, but in the long term this appears to slow economic growth' (T. Hydrocarbons are usually point specific and so their exploitation is easily controlled and monopolized. This is why they serve as a natural basis for oligarchy and autocracy. Cod was widely spread in the fjords; controlling and monopolizing its catch was practically impossible. Since it is also a perishable commodity, even the most martial of the Viking kings would have thought twice before trying to accumulate the entire fish catch of the country. Cod did not make Norway wealthy, but it did facilitate the spreading of the little wealth there was widely among the population." (Ibid.)
factors that facilitate gradual economic development and the emergence of political democracy 12 . The same principles apply to, say, forestry or agriculture. The experience of the USA during the nineteenth century, when it was richly endowed with natural resources, provides a graphic example of this kind of development.
Secondly, the level of political development at the moment when an abundance of natural resources begins to be exploited is of great importance. There have been cases (admittedly, rather few) when countries possessing a very high level of economic and political development and the full panoply of modern democratic institutions unexpectedly became "resource abundant". In these countries with highly developed political systems, where the economic system was diversified and highly efficient, governmental decision-making in relation to resource exploitation was transparent and corruption was virtually non-existent.
Great Britain and, especially, Norway, following the discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea, are examples. These countries avoided any deceleration in growth or degeneration of the economy. Even these countries, however, are not immune to the dangers of populism. Judging by Norway's experience during the last 20 years there is a substantial of risk that government economic policy will succumb, in the medium term, to the influence of interest groups of one kind or another 13 .
Thirdly, in conditions of natural resource abundance an economy can successfully develop even in absolute monarchies. In so far as the state budget in these countries is practically co-extensive with the budget of the ruling dynasty and that concern for future generations is, in a very literal sense, "close to home", the authorities are more capable of thinking "long-term" and of taking sensible decisions, for example in the sphere of general social welfare. However, in our day and age this type of régime is exceedingly rare and their policies do not always have successful outcomes, as we can see from the record of the Gulf states. Even so -and we should like to emphasize this point -such states are quite capable of achieving economic prosperity.
12 "Democracy is rule by the many, and autocracy is rule by the few. The concentration of power resources leads to autocracy, and the distribution of power resources among the many leads to democracy". On reaching this conclusion, Vanhanen hypothesizes that "democratization takes place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or maintain its hegemony" (Vanhanen T. Prospects for Democracy.., p. 24). Similar views are expressed by M. Olson who argues that "autocracy is prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate -a dispersion of force and resources that makes it impossible for any leader or group to overpower all the others…If the theory offered here is right, the literature that argues that the emergence of democracy is due to historical conditions and dispersions of resources that make it impossible for any one leader or group to assume all power is also right. Our discussion has been based mainly on materials pertaining to the second half of the twentieth century. However, the same logic of events can be discerned in the past. Of course, most problems of economic policy have to be examined in their historical context, with due regard to the concrete circumstances, taking into account above all the level of technological development (as Marx put it, the "level of development of productive forces"). Even so, it seems to be the case that governments in the past, when faced with similar problems, have responded with similar measures and made similar mistakes. Let us take the example of a country that acquired an abundance of natural resources -a benefit that arrived unexpectedly and facilitated this country's political ambitions 14 . So it was that from the very beginning of the sixteenth century the New World became a source of both gold and silver and by the second half of the 1530s these metals had begun to be delivered in quite substantial volumes. The flow of revenues from the import of precious metals is described in Table 1 . These revenues became directly available to the Crown (in modern terminology, to the state budget) and an even greater proportion was acquired by private interests. This proportion, of course, also supplemented the state budget by way of taxation, revenues from coinage, and by other indirect routes. on the state budget. An additional factor was the "`Gunpowder Revolution" -the transition during this period from cavalry to more expensive firearms 16 .
Spain in the 16
It seemed at first that silver and gold could indeed serve as the reliable foundation of Spain's finances, given the increasing circulation of coin. The inflow of precious metals made for a sharp increase in the money supply and in the budgetary resources at the disposal of the government. However, this abundant money supply enabled the rulers of Spain to ignore the state of the economy and opportunities for bringing tax and budgetary policies up to the standards of the time.
As would frequently be the case in later resource-rich economies, the economic policy of the Spanish government was astonishingly shortsighted. Spain had no long-term strategy for stimulating production and the isolated measures taken by the government were aimed primarily at easing social tensions and attracting additional revenues. Price regulation, the distribution of monopolies in the production and trading of valuable goods, high and inequitable taxes and the retention of customs barriers inside the country were the key instruments of economic management of the Spanish Crown. Even by the sixteenth century these instruments had begun to look somewhat old-fashioned.
For example, to combat increases in the price of grain, the government imposed price controls and succeeded only in creating a grain shortage. It then decided to encourage grain imports, which had the effect of ruining domestic grain production and turning the country into a grain importer for centuries thereafter. Similar errors were committed with regard to textile production.
The Spanish tax system was archaic and tax levels were among the highest in Europe.
Although around 97 percent of all lands belonged to the aristocracy and the Church, direct taxes were levied only on the peasantry, artisans and merchants. A number of taxes were collected by the aristocracy, who transferred the revenues to the Crown. This very narrow tax base was ineffective as a source of budgetary revenues. The system of taxation, being purely fiscal in conception, had the effect of suppressing, rather than stimulating, economic growth.
Customs barriers continued to exist between different parts of the Empire (even inside the Iberian Peninsula), a state of affairs that was motivated in part by fiscal considerations, in part by the clinging of the authorities to tradition. Different currencies circulated within the Empire and currency conversion was a laborious procedure in both domestic and external transactions.
In due course the abundant inflow of precious metals gave rise to serious political and financial problems.
The first was that the needs of the Crown for money grew faster than the revenues obtained the overseas dominions. The state budget came under pressure and the national debt increased. For all its ample monetary resources, the state entered into a prolonged period of budget deficit. This had never happened before the reign of Charles I. His predecessors had occasionally resorted to borrowing but for specific and temporary purposes only. Now the budget deficit became chronic.
The logic of the unfolding financial crisis is crystal clear. On the one hand, the Crown felt able to engage in unlimited borrowing, deriving confidence from its vast silver and gold reserves; on the other, creditors willingly lent money (at usurious rates of interest) against the collateral of future supplies of precious metals. In this way, there developed the condition that is known in contemporary social theory as "moral hazard "-when decision makers consider themselves to be immune from the consequences of decisions taken.
The Crown's debt began rapidly to increase. In the first half of the 1570s, Spain's annual budgetary expenditure exceeded revenues by 50 percent and huge sums were spent on the repayment of old debts. In 1575 alone, 36 million ducats -an amount equivalent to six years of budgetary revenues -were spent on paying off old debts. In 1577, the Crown had revenues of 13 million ducats, but by 1582 accumulated debt amounted to 80 million ducats.
According to some estimates, two-thirds of the payments made in 1598 (when Philip II died) covered only the interest on government debt. Thereafter, the national debt continued to increase, reaching 180 million ducats by 1667, an unprecedented total for that time 17 .
The second problem was inflation. The financial system was caught in a bind: the abundance of precious metals were the source of substantial monetary resources but this very abundance made for a fall in the per-unit purchasing power of these very precious metals. (see Fig. 1 ). This inflationary spiral had the effect of devaluing the Crown's revenues.
Since inflation was at that time a little-understood phenomenon in Western Europe, a large proportion of treasury revenues (and of the revenues of other economic agents) was accounted for in absolute values. After a certain period of time (in the second half of the sixteenth century), the purchasing power of budget revenues expressed in absolute values (see of American gold and silver, but, as later became clear, in quantities insufficient to provide a secure financial basis for Spain's ambitious foreign policy. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the budget of Spain was, more often than not, in deficit (see Fig 3) .
Furthermore, since Spain, for obvious reasons, was the first country to be hit by the depreciation of metal currency, the competitiveness of Spanish producers declined: the cost of Spanish goods in monetary terms exceeded equivalent prices charged in other countries.
Something similar to a "Dutch disease" resulted, although the impact was not as great as it would be with the development of the modern global market. The third problem was a direct outcome of the first two problems: the Empire's economy and politics had been "re-structured" according to the apparent advantages conferred by currency revenues and this exposed Spain to two kinds of risk: firstly, the political and commercial weakness of the Crown became apparent to its creditors who, understanding full well that the Crown could no longer survive without their support, acquired the opportunity for blackmail; secondly, the economy and political system of the Empire became increasingly vulnerable to the impact of external events, which is to say to changes in the economic conjuncture.
Spain received foreign loans at high interest rates from a financial cartel controlled by the Genoese, as well as from German, Flemish and Spanish bankers. By way of collateral, the Spanish Crown offered its creditors shares in silver supplies and revenues from particular taxes. The bankers were also granted licenses to service the financial operations of the Crown, including a monopoly on international money transfers and currency conversion. Given that the territories of Spain were scattered throughout Europe, these services were of exceptional importance not only economically but also from the political and military points of view.
Since different parts of the Empire employed different currencies, the reliability of currency transfers was of vital importance to the maintenance of political stability. Of even greater importance was the execution of payments for the wars in which the Spanish kings were perpetually engaged. Any inappropriate action by the debtor could result in a suspension of payments by the creditors, with all of the negative consequences that would ensue.
As early as the mid-sixteenth century the dependence of Spain on the inflow of American currency became increasingly problematical. A decline in the supply of precious metals to the Treasury in the second half of the 1550s resulted in a first default by the Crown in 1557 and to another in 1560. The first default was preceded by an unprecedented political default: Charles, apparently realizing that the mounting problems were of an acute and systemic nature, abdicated in 1556 after forty years on the Spanish throne.
The data in Table 1 lend themselves to one further observation: although between 1556 and 1560 the supply of precious metals to Spain decreased by more than half compared with the previous five-year period, yet the volume remained on a par with deliveries from earlier periods (the late 1540s and earlier). However, these 15-20 years had witnessed a number of significant changes in the monetary and financial environment: on the one hand, inflation had reduced the purchasing power of "American" money; and on the other, Spain had become increasingly dependent upon new financial transfusions as it became increasingly involved in projects for imperial expansion.
By the end of the sixteenth century, Spain had become completely dependent on the output of the American mines. A country that had formerly possessed a stable financial system began repeatedly to default on its foreign debts: after the defaults of 1557 and 1560, there were defaults in 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1653 and 1680. 19 For some time (under Philip II), Spain continued to expand, eventually conquering Portugal with its huge Eastern colonies. However, there ensued a series of military defeats. The crushing defeat of the "Invincible Armada" in 1588 was one of the most grievous blows. The financial crisis was followed by a monetary crisis: lacking budgetary resources, Philip III and Philip IV had recourse to a "spoiling" or "dilution" of the currency, reducing the gold and silver content of a number of coins 20 . But these measures had only a short-term impact on the state budget and were incapable of halting the process of economic decline. During the seventeenth century this decline continued inexorably and Spain ended up as a second-rate power 21 .
Despite mounting problems, the heirs of Charles I persisted with his policies, focusing their efforts on the attainment of imperial and messianic goals and ignoring the need to create favorable conditions for economic development. Spain began to lag further and further behind other European states. The Netherlands, England and France assumed leading positions in the world economy. 22 Seduced by natural wealth (the equivalent of "cheap" money), Spain had aligned its priorities with its new levels of income and succumbed to political and economic self-indulgence. 23 The crisis that ensued was profound and its effects would be felt for the next four hundred years.
To sum up -the crisis of the Spanish Empire was a result not only -and not so much -of its over-inflated ambitions as of its ill-considered and ineffective economic and budgetary policies.
First, inflated political ambitions were partly provoked by the increasing inflow of "cheap" money, which prompted the Crown to intensify its efforts to consolidate and enlarge the empire.
Second, economic problems were triggered not so much by war as by inefficient policies. World history knows many instances when countries conducted bitter and protracted wars without experiencing financial or economic crisis. The Netherlands during the sixteenth
